Epistemic Humility As Disposition

With the last post in mind ( found here), I want to come to a clearer understanding of epistemic humility. I want us to think about what we are being asked to do, when asked to nurture epistemic humility. Or better, what are we not asked to do? Epistemic humility could be misunderstood as a request to both believe and not-believe what we in fact do believe. I want to show that is not the request.



We defined epistemic humility as follows:  Let S stand for any human subject and p stand for any proposition S holds to be true (for the sake of simplicity p may stand for any set of propositions S holds to be true). We might say S possesses epistemic humility when S realizes that p may be false. We also eliminated various necessary truths as practically unhelpful in determining one's view of the world.

The temptation now may be to pick a particular proposition as an example of p, say proposition A, and determine whether or not we can in fact both believe A and simultaneously "realize that A may be false." Maybe we could take some perceptual experience and form a proposition such as, "I am sitting at my computer typing." Although I could certainly recognize that I may be dreaming; this approach, I say, is a start in the wrong direction. If we do succeed (i.e. find we are able to posses epistemic humility in relation to A), we are no closer to understanding how one comes to have epistemic humility. If we do not succeed, we have only determined that if this definition of epistemic humility is correct, then we did not exercise it in this instance. So, how does one maintain epistemic humility in practice? How does one succeed in exhibiting (possessing) epistemic humility in relation to all relevant propositions (i.e. worldview forming: propositions, beliefs, opinions)? Maybe we need a clarification of "realizes" as used in our definition.

Epistemic humility is a disposition regarding one's ability to know with certainty. To realize p may be false is not a realization about p, but a realization about my ability to know p with certainty. This realization is a result of a disposition of humility as regards my epistemic capabilities, not the result of anything particular to p. In fact, this disposition may be understood as a tendency to find ways whereby p may be understood as false. This may be as easy as simply imagining the conditions under which p is false.

Admittedly, the degree to which I am able to exhibit epistemic humility may vary. But, this is inconsequential as long as I act on the degree of humility I posses. Put another way, all I need to realize is that I may be wrong, however so slight the degree. Keep in mind that our goal is to avoid that kind of certainty which appears able to justify injustice. And our primary assumption at this point is that if we can recognize our epistemic limitations, we will be less apt to mistreat one another. This is especially important as concerns beliefs of ultimate concern (be they religious, metaphysical, or ethical).

So it is not the case that we are being asked to somehow magically become illogical. We are not pulling ourselves up by the bootstraps in a colossal attempt at transgressing the law of non-contradiction (found here). We are simply nurturing the ability to constantly recognize our epistemic limitations, our inability to know very much for certain.

A specifically Christian theological consideration:

I think Christians may have a peculiarly difficult time nurturing epistemic humility. We generally hold our beliefs, as they concern the Faith, as if they are certain. And yet, the very fact that we may refer to Christianity as the "Faith" speaks of something less than certain.

Furthermore, sometimes Christians act (and believe) as if the great truths of the gospel are obviously true, albeit only when seen in the appropriate light. This disposition is difficult to understand. The great truths of the gospel are neither deductively nor inductively accessible. Without the proclamation of the Good News, no one would have simply discovered these great truths.

The issue is exacerbated when we assume that one can simply choose to believe these great truths. And so I ask again: If you believe in the resurrection, can you at this very moment choose to believe that Christ, at this very moment, is dead? I would think not. This works both ways.

This is not to say I cannot place myself in a position to come-to-believe other than I now do. I ( and anyone else for that matter) in fact can. I can look at all the arguments for and against, consider carefully the options, and just maybe my current belief will change. But, there is no guarantee.

The very fact that I cannot simply choose to believe what I in fact do believe about the resurrection should function as a caution against any undue pride. In fact, the opposite is the case. I should function with a healthy amount of humility as concerns the process whereby I have come-to-believe.

Furthermore, I can imagine the conditions under which a proposition asserting the truth of the resurrection is in fact false. I can imagine that Christ is at this moment not-alive. I can imagine that the tomb of Christ is now, and since his death always has been, not-empty. I don't believe this, but it certainly could be the case. I now have the relevant epistemic conditions necessary to posses epistemic humility as concerns this proposition.

But as I have already said this is a start in the wrong direction. What we need, whether we are Christians or not, is a disposition of epistemic humility. I touched on the possibility, in the last post, that epistemic humility is achieved via a process of induction. Over a period of time, I have a sufficient number of having-been-wrong experiences so that I become reluctant to take an unadulterated dogmatic stance regarding relevant propositions. Or another way, I have been wrong often enough to recognize I may be wrong again. I do not function as if I am wrong, but I also do not function as if you are obviously wrong.

Does all of this prevent sharing the great truths of the gospel? No. But we always proceed with humility and empathy. We recognize and monopolize upon our shared ignorance. In revealing our common ignorance we clear the way for faith (Kant).