Thursday, December 7, 2017

Truth in terms of fit

It used to be fashionable to talk about truth as something almost wholly contingent upon the experience of the subjective self. “Objective truth” was anathema. Truth was pliable, malleable, and subject to perspective. Just the possibility of being able to “create our own truth” was stimulating! But, for better or for worse, those happy days are gone. What was once fashionable and stimulating has become grotesque, frightening, and all too real. People who have power are creating their own truth. Now, we have “alternative facts” and “fake news.” These aren’t just theories about truth. These are actual phrases that come out of living people’s mouths, as if it’s the truth. Consequently, what used to be stylish and smart is now out. The conversation is no longer about how wonderful it is that we are free to create our own truth. So, what now? How shall we think and talk about truth, now?

Thursday, June 16, 2016

Radical Skepticism

Radical skepticism is a particularly vulgar form of certainty. It is dogmatism without content.

Thursday, December 24, 2015

That Which Seems True and the Phenomenology of Belief

In his defense of religious exclusivism, Alvin Plantinga gives a somewhat tangential mention of a phenomenology that attends belief (citation at end). In this post, I am not interested in speaking to Plantinga’s defense of exclusivism, but I do want to consider this phenomenology of belief he mentions. To whit, it seems to me that if we believe something, part of why we believe that something is because it strikes us as true. That is, it seems true to us. This phenomenon of seeming true (or, false, for that matter) is not wholly within our control. Why does that matter? Well, for me, I have struggled to find ways to clarify my understanding of not only the experience of belief, but also the humility that it seems should attend belief. Something Plantinga says in that defense has helped me understand these better.

Thursday, July 23, 2015

A Reductio for Eliminative Materialism

Can arguments for eliminative materialism be made without employing some aspects of so-called “folk psychology” and does it matter if they cannot? These are questions I want to explore.