Realized Ignorance

I am going to assume, for the moment, that any approach to achieving peaceful coexistence among differing cultures, religions, worldviews, ideologies, etc. will include an account for nurturing epistemic humility. As the world we inhabit “shrinks,” we must find a way to peacefully agree to disagree. More to the point, it is imperative that we realize our ignorance, both individually and as a community.

What is epistemic humility? Let S stand for any human subject and p stand for any proposition S holds to be true (I will be using “proposition,” “belief,” and “opinion” as synonymous). We might say S possesses epistemic humility when S realizes that p may be false.

We might even define epistemic humility in terms of a community of human subjects. Let CS stand for any community of human subjects and p stand for any proposition CS holds to be true. Thus, CS possesses epistemic humility when CS realizes that p may be false. Of course, we can extend these definitions to include sets of propositions instead of just one.

So we have a working definition of epistemic humility. There is; however, some further clarification needed. These definitions assume that it is in fact the case the any p under consideration may be false. How do we determine which propositions are under consideration? I suppose there are some propositions that are necessarily true. However, without going into detail, I assume that these necessary truths are either tautologies or trivial. In other words, though some truths may be necessary, they are probably not all that helpful in determining one’s overall view of the world (i.e. worldview).

The very opposite is the case as concerns those beliefs that “really matter” in terms of one’s overall view of the world. Put another way, if a majority of the beliefs that form our understanding of the world were necessary truths, then there would be little disagreement. Since there is considerable disagreement, it seems probable that few worldview forming beliefs are necessary. This is an arguable point, and I admit that I could be mistaken. One thing we might do is restrict the domain of what propositions we are considering by excluding any proposition that is a tautology or is trivial.

At any length, what does not seem controversial is 1) All worldviews include propositions about what is in fact the case; 2) The majority (if not all) of these propositions are not necessary truths; and 3) Forming a worldview is necessary for  a holistic understanding of reality. Okay, these three may be controversial. Let’s move forward since the question at hand does not depend on deciding these issues first (so much for further clarification:).

My question is this (stated variously): How do we nurture epistemic humility? How do we realize our own ignorance (i.e. lack of knowledge)?  How do we come to realize that p may be false?

It seems that one route to acquiring epistemic humility is the result of an inductive process; whereby, past changes in beliefs support the abandonment of dogmatic tendencies. At this point I will employ my personal experience as an example.

I now hold beliefs that are contrary to beliefs I held in the past. Again, I have dogmatically held beliefs in the past that I no longer hold as true. So, I now believe these prior beliefs are false. This has happened a number of times; although, I am not sure how many. Nonetheless, the number of times it has happened is sufficient in bringing about my current tendency to be less dogmatic. This, I say, has been a process. Ironically, what has played a key part in this process is education.

One might assume that the whole point of education is knowledge, so that the result of having an education is that one has more knowledge. And this may true in one sense; but false in another sense.            

That education increases one’s knowledge may be true in one sense. We will turn to Socrates for elaboration. “I certainly do not think I am guessing that right opinion is a different thing from knowledge. If I claim to know anything else-and I would make that claim about few things-I would put this down as one of the things I know” (Plato “Meno.” Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett PC, 1997, 896).

Here Socrates does claim that he knows something. In particular, he knows that right opinion is not the same thing as knowledge. So what is the difference between right opinion and knowledge? It seems that right opinion is simply a correct guess. Speaking of right opinions Socrates says “…they are not worth much until one ties them down by giving an account of the reason why…After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place” (Plato. “Meno” 895).

From the outset it might help to say that this is probably one of the earliest accounts of knowledge understood as justified-true-belief. In other words, S knows p = df. (i) S believes p, (ii) p is true, (iii) S is justified in believing p (This account of knowledge as justified-true-belief is taken from: Feldman, Richard. Epistemology. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003, 15). We can say that Socrates' use of right opinion pertains to (i) and (ii); while the process of “giving an account of the reason why” pertains to (iii).

For a number of reasons, I do not believe that a right opinion becomes knowledge simply because it is “tied down.” In fact even “tied down” right opinions may still be false (we might think of Edmund Gettier's account found here). It should be clear that I am working with a very strong definition of knowledge; something like: S knows p if and only if S is certain of p. Given this understanding of knowledge, it is probable that what may be known is not much. But, even if we allow for a weaker definition of knowledge (such that a tied down opinion is knowledge) we are still confronted with the potential for dogmatism and conflict. It may not matter how I define knowledge. If I mistreat others because they believe other than I do or because they don’t know what I know, then I am in need of epistemic humility.      

Anyway, Socrates knows at least one thing: right opinion and knowledge are two different things. I think this is an initial step in realizing one’s ignorance. Once we are able to see that most of what we believe is in fact not-knowledge, but potentially right opinion, we have made a beginning. We may go further and say that once we realize that our belief must be justified (or in Socrates words “tied down”) we have tacitly admitted that the belief in question may be false. Notice, we are not committed to the assertion that said belief is in fact false, only that it may be. So what does this have to do with education?

We might say that my education results in more knowledge than that with which I began if and only if we understand knowledge in terms of knowing what I may be mistaken about (so maybe it does matter how we define knowledge). Put another way, the more propositions I recognize as needing justification, the more I recognize that these propositions may be false. So in this sense I do know more than I did when I began.

So in sum, I believe education is paramount in realizing one’s own ignorance. Now we may ask, “What do I mean by education?” In my case, the education I am referring to was received in a “brick and mortar” institution. But, I do not believe that such an education is necessary for an individual to realize her ignorance and thus nurture epistemic humility.

With the increasing availability of competing propositions via technology, I think that epistemic humility is available to anyone who is willing to 1) be honest, 2) consider other points of view, and 3) carefully consider the reasons for her own beliefs. And yet, it may be that simple exposure to other points of view is sufficient to bring about this needed humility. I stated earlier that the lessening in dogmatic tendencies in my own life was an inductive process by which I concluded from a number of changed beliefs that my current beliefs may also be wrong. I am not sure what the magic number is, but I think it is the case that sufficient exposure to an honest appraisal of competing beliefs, via technology, may do the trick. Of course "old school"  forms of communication, such as books, are still great candidates for nurturing epistemic humility. The problem is that not everyone will spend time reading. Technology in the form of social networks, for instance, is being used by many people who may not otherwise be exposed to many competing beliefs. 

Said another way, an individual may not need to attend a “brick and mortar” institution to come to a sufficient number of changed beliefs. (Notice that I am assuming that an individual who never changes her beliefs is a poor candidate for epistemic humility. Until we experience actually being mistaken, how will we ever assume that being mistaken is possible? Furthermore, if I experience being mistaken only once, I do not seem to have a good reason to assume it will ever happen again.) Anyway, this education may occur simply by using the technology available today.

I suppose what I just said could be misconstrued to mean that as more and more people spend more and more time using technological devices, the desired epistemic humility will obtain. And thus, peaceful coexistence between differing groups will naturally result. That is not quite what I mean. But, I do think the potential is there.

At any rate, the work must first begin on an individual level with an honest assessment of one’s beliefs. And the key, as far as I understand it, is recognizing what Socrates recognized: there is a difference between right opinion and knowledge. Further, this recognition hinges on realizing that once I am forced to “tie down” my beliefs I have tacitly admitted those beliefs may be false. This realization that I must tie down my beliefs most readily occurs when confronted with competing beliefs. Hence, the more competing beliefs I am exposed to, the more tying down that is needed, the more I realize that I may be wrong, and the more I realize my ignorance (i.e. the knowledge I lack). This, I believe, is one more way to nurture epistemic humility.

All of this is simply a sketch that I am not sure about, and so much more can be said. There are also other related issues that need to be addressed. For instance, what is the relation between epistemic humility and peaceful coexistence? How does the one bring about the other, or does it? How are we to go forward meaningfully in life; while knowing that we know so very little? How do we move from individual epistemic humility to community epistemic humility? How do we avoid slipping from epistemic humility into radical skepticism? These are, I think, important questions. Let me finish by saying that all of this could be false:)