On punishment and reform

In terms of culpability, we seem to assume any agent could have done otherwise. Without being able to do otherwise, we don't usually consider an agent culpable. That much we often assume. And, in this case the emphasis is on a hypothetical past action. In terms of correction, the emphasis is on punishment and the failure of adherence to a past possibility. But why think focusing on what could have been done is preferable as a corrective?

Bouwsma

If you enjoy philosophy and ever get the chance to read O.K. Bouwsma's essay "Descartes' Evil Genius" don't pass it up. How I wish more philosophers (including myself) wrote with such wit and in a style that both captivates and gives enjoyment. I recently purchased a book of his essays and have not wanted to put it down. Pure pleasure. Also, his argument in "Descartes' Evil Genius" is worth considering.

Lies and Behaviorism

Is behaviorism still a thing? Apparently, it is still making inroads, or ruts, in education (See here, here, and here). I guess some bad ideas have a slow, slow death. Well, let's remind ourselves why behaviorism is so, so wrong-headed. Let's do this by observing the all-too-common lie.

If you have the essence, you have it all. Or, not.

I came across an interesting argument by Frederick Copleston in his A History of Philosophy: Volume 1. I will give the quote in question and then share some comments.

Non-Political Space

In his recent article "Against Bipartisanship" (found here), Robert B. Talisse argues that the solution to our stark political divisions is not bipartisanship, but finding non-political space and activities within which to engage one another. I wholly agree.

No Ideal

We live in a time where primacy and place are given to the particular. We have lost sight of the goal, any goal. Every particular is primary, which means no particular is primary. What are we to do now that we have no ideals worth pursuing? Will the cacophony of voices somehow magically form a chorus?

Can naturalism save us from naturalism?

In their latest article "Neuroexistentialism" for The Philosophers' Magazine (found here), Owen Flanagan and Gregg D. Caruso argue that we have entered a third-wave of existentialism, namely neuroexistentialism. To quote, "Today, there is a third-wave existentialism, neuroexistentialism, which expresses the anxiety that, even as science yields the truth about human nature, it also disenchants." No doubt, the ascendency of science and scientists as the sole authorities on every area of human nature has created a sense of disenchantment. We are told that we have no free will, that our moral decision making is determined by physical processes, and that in fact there is no more to the human person than the physical self. The old meaning-makers, God and the soul, have been cast aside for the hard, cold facts of science and a thoroughly material universe. But, let's be honest, this is a reality of our own choosing. And, it's based on limits we have constructed for ourselves and then accepted.

A working word that still does no work

A few years back, I wrote a post in which I argued that the term "supervenience" doesn't do the work that physicalists seem to think it does (see here). I have been reading the essay on physicalism in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind written by Andrew Melnyk. In it he makes the same observation I was trying to make.

Common Moral Obligation

I find the tribalism in our current culture to be not only disturbing, but a sure-fire way to destroy our common life together. If we are to survive the current situation, together, then we need to re-appropriate an understanding of our common humanity.

Are we expecting too much from causality?

I remember my professor saying that Hume couldn't know for sure if his eggs for breakfast would nourish him or kill him.

The skeptic's dependence on common sense

It seems to me that those who argue for external world skepticism seem to rely on the reality of an external world, or at least our common sense notions about it.

Virtuous Faith

In his recent paper titled "Faith and Epistemology" (see here or here),  Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa gives a refreshing look at faith and it's common occurrence in everyday reasoning. The paper is open access, so please give it your perusal.

The next step in evolution?

By now you have probably seen more than one article claiming that the next step in human evolution will be a kind of merge between humans and technology. Andy Clark's recent article "We are merging with robots. That's a good thing" (found here) is just one example. One of the interesting things about this claim is that it ignores one principle tenet of (Darwinian) evolution. Up to this point, most naturalists have assumed that evolution has been unguided. But, whatever will happen with humans as we become ever more immersed within and potentially merge with technology, it is certain that it need not be unguided. In fact, if we are thinking aright about these things, we will guide it as best we can.

Reading other minds

In his recent article "The theory of mind myth," Robert Burton argues that we are not as good at reading other's minds as we might think, or as some neuroscientists have encouraged us to believe (see Burton's article here). To some extent, I am inclined to agree with Burton. But, I wonder if our inability to read other minds is not so much due to our inability as it is to the tendency of others to mask intention.

Cynical

When I was an adolescent, I began to realize that the adults in my world were no better than I was at upholding the standards they held up for me. This had a profound effect on me. I became cynical.

Why I am Orthodox

When I first began to reconsider the Christian faith, the one thing I accepted without hesitation is the premise that there is something terribly wrong with us, as humans. We are wonderful. And, we are amazingly so. I don’t deny that. And yet, we are capable of horrendous evil. And, the evil we bring into this world is in no way necessary.

A Pre-Socratic Crush

I am fascinated by the Pre-Socratic philosophers. Why the general tendency towards monism? Thales' water, Anaximander's eternal indeterminate, Anaximenes' air, and of course Heraclitus' fire all try to pinpoint the one thing upon which all else depends. What is the one "stuff" from which the multiplicity arises? They were, in general, materialists. Material monists, if you will. The only problem with saying they were materialists is that they had not yet developed the kind of dual (material/spiritual) understanding of reality from which contemporary ideas of materialism have their provenance. Their dualism, if we can say that they had one, was the one and the many.

The Persistence of Evil

I don't hold to a complicated concept of evil. Evil is whatever works against, or seeks to undo, that which is good. Furthermore, that which is good is that which works in favor of flourishing life. And finally, life is not mere existence. Life, if it happens, is meaningful. In this sense, evil is not a mystery. We all know what it is. We look around us and see that we are surrounded by people doing things or saying things that work against meaningful life. Sometimes, we even participate. That's at best. At worst, we continually see those who destroy meaningful life, intentionally and without good reason (see definition of "good" above). In short, evil happens and we all know it. Evil is not a mystery. What is a mystery, however, is that evil continues. Why is that? How is it that evil persists?

Big Brains

“…why should we be troubled by Leibniz’s point that if the brain were blown up to the size of a factory, so that we could stroll through it, we should not see thoughts? If we know enough neural correlations, we shall indeed see thoughts-in the sense that our vision will reveal to us what thoughts the possessor of the brain is having. If we do not, we shall not, but then if we stroll through any factory without having first learned about its parts and their relations to one another, we shall not see what is going on. Further, even if we could find no such neural correlations, even if cerebral localization of thoughts was a complete failure, why would we want to say that a person’s thoughts or mental images were nonphysical simply because we cannot give an account of them in terms of his parts?” Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Thirteenth-Anniversary Edition 2009) 26.

 

Indeed, why should we be troubled by Leibniz’s point? It is only troubling if we want very badly to conflate or reduce the mental to specific neural correlations. And in doing so, discard the ontological reality of our mental experience.

Truth in terms of fit

It used to be fashionable to talk about truth as something almost wholly contingent upon the experience of the subjective self. “Objective truth” was anathema. Truth was pliable, malleable, and subject to perspective. Just the possibility of being able to “create our own truth” was stimulating! But, for better or for worse, those happy days are gone. What was once fashionable and stimulating has become grotesque, frightening, and all too real. People who have power are creating their own truth. Now, we have “alternative facts” and “fake news.” Consequently, what used to be stylish and smart is now out. The conversation is no longer about how wonderful it is that we are free to create our own truth. So, what now? How shall we think and talk about truth, now?