"...the conclusions reached in philosophical disquisitions...do not travel into contexts that are not explicitly philosophical (as seminars, academic journals, and conferences are), and they do not even make their way into the non-philosophical lives of those who hold them."In Part I of this post I will address what I believe to be Fish's basic position. Then I will show why I both agree and disagree with that position. In Part II, I will address the not wholly unrelated question, "Does Christian Philosophy Matter?"
Fish's article is framed in the context of the philosophical discussion between moral absolutism and moral relativism. His main position seems to be that the philosophical dispute itself is an epistemological issue (i.e. an issue concerning what one believes about morality in general). Whereas, in everyday moral decisions, the philosophical side on which an individual may position herself has absolutely no bearing on the moral choices she actually makes. He asserts,
"The fact that you might give one set of answers rather than another to standard philosophical questions will say nothing about how you will behave when something other than a point of philosophy is in dispute."On the one hand I think Fish is right. What an individual believes about morality in general cannot be a "prophetic word" about how she will act in any given situation. This is obviously true for the moral relativist. The very position of moral relativism disallows for the possibility of determining how one will act given any particular moral choice. And likewise, just because an individual asserts belief in moral absolutes does not mean that individual will act accordingly. However, does this mean that what one believes about morality has no influence upon that individual's moral choices? Fish seems to think so,
"But the ability to make judgments of right and wrong does not depend on your holding a particular belief about morality in general"I disagree with this last assertion by Fish. I would like to examine why one's belief about morality and how one acts morally might appear independent of one another. This appearance of independence may result from a lack of rigorous self-examination. For instance, I may assert belief in moral relativism because it is appealing to me ( maybe it is appealing because it seems post-modern, and I like anything post-modern). While at the same time, I may also seek rigorous honesty in virtually all circumstances. I do this not because of the circumstances themselves, but because I (unbeknownst to me) believe one should always tell the truth. My moral behavior may not appear dependent on my general belief, because I have not sufficiently examined the beliefs that my actions represent.
Or, this appearance of independence may result from my simple inability to fully embody what I know I believe. This may happen in degrees. I may embody my beliefs to a greater degree than I used to. Or, I may embody my beliefs to a greater degree at some times and a lesser degree at other times. This may simply be a process. In other words, I am becoming that which I believe to be true. So it is not the case in these instances that my beliefs and my acts are unrelated. They just appear to be independent of one another.
Let me close part I by offering another way in which I may be in agreement with Fish. Fish seems to be of the opinion that philosophy is,
"a special, insular form of thought and its propositions have weight and value only in the precincts of its game."If this is how we are to understand philosophy, then I must agree. If philosophy is simply a game (Wittgenstein?) with its own "insular...precincts," then by definition it must be relegated to a position outside of the domain of our work-a-day world and its moral decisions. And this brings us to the topic in Part II. Until then...keep asking questions, it does not hurt.
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Reference:
“Does Philosophy Matter?,” by Stanley Fish, The New York Times op-ed page, Aug. 1, 2011.
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/does-philosophy-matter/
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