That Which Seems True and the Phenomenology of Belief

In his defense of religious exclusivism, Alvin Plantinga gives a somewhat tangential mention of a phenomenology that attends belief (citation at end). In this post, I am not interested in speaking to Plantinga’s defense of exclusivism, but I do want to consider this phenomenology of belief he mentions. To whit, it seems to me that if we believe something, part of why we believe that something is because it strikes us as true. That is, it seems true to us. This phenomenon of seeming true (or, false, for that matter) is not wholly within our control. Why does that matter? Well, for me, I have struggled to find ways to clarify my understanding of not only the experience of belief, but also the humility that it seems should attend belief. Something Plantinga says in that defense has helped me understand these better.

A Reductio for Eliminative Materialism

Can arguments for eliminative materialism be made without employing some aspects of so-called “folk psychology” and does it matter if they cannot? These are questions I want to explore. 

An Education In Virtue

"But I take it...what we have in mind is education from childhood in virtue, a training which produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen..." from Plato's Laws I (643e)

Historicism and Literalism: Strange Bedfellows

For some time I have been considering the thesis that both historicism and literalism emphasize the historical in such a way that said emphasis creates a barrier to significance for each, but in different ways. For this post I will limit my considerations to how this common emphasis is exemplified within Christianity; however, a similar critique may be applicable elsewhere.