I have been reading John Searle’s Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception, 2015 (see here). From the start, his basic argument has reminded me of a similar argument made by Mortimer J. Adler in his Ten Philosophical Mistakes, 1985 (see here). Not only do they both argue that the same mistake has been made, but they both offer very similar solutions.
Monday, September 19, 2016
Thursday, June 16, 2016
Monday, April 4, 2016
Thursday, December 24, 2015
In his defense of religious exclusivism, Alvin Plantinga gives a somewhat tangential mention of a phenomenology that attends belief (citation at end). In this post, I am not interested in speaking to Plantinga’s defense of exclusivism, but I do want to consider this phenomenology of belief he mentions. To whit, it seems to me that if we believe something, part of why we believe that something is because it strikes us as true. That is, it seems true to us. This phenomenon of seeming true (or, false, for that matter) is not wholly within our control. Why does that matter? Well, for me, I have struggled to find ways to clarify my understanding of not only the experience of belief, but also the humility that it seems should attend belief. Something Plantinga says in that defense has helped me understand these better.
Thursday, July 23, 2015
Can arguments for eliminative materialism be made without employing some aspects of so-called “folk psychology” and does it matter if they cannot? These are questions I want to explore.