Monday, September 19, 2016

A well-worn philosophical mistake?

I have been reading John Searle’s Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception, 2015 (see here). From the start, his basic argument has reminded me of a similar argument made by Mortimer J. Adler in his Ten Philosophical Mistakes, 1985 (see here). Not only do they both argue that the same mistake has been made, but they both offer very similar solutions.

Thursday, June 16, 2016

Radical Skepticism

Radical skepticism is a particularly vulgar form of certainty. It is dogmatism without content.

Thursday, December 24, 2015

That Which Seems True and the Phenomenology of Belief

In his defense of religious exclusivism, Alvin Plantinga gives a somewhat tangential mention of a phenomenology that attends belief (citation at end). In this post, I am not interested in speaking to Plantinga’s defense of exclusivism, but I do want to consider this phenomenology of belief he mentions. To whit, it seems to me that if we believe something, part of why we believe that something is because it strikes us as true. That is, it seems true to us. This phenomenon of seeming true (or, false, for that matter) is not wholly within our control. Why does that matter? Well, for me, I have struggled to find ways to clarify my understanding of not only the experience of belief, but also the humility that it seems should attend belief. Something Plantinga says in that defense has helped me understand these better.

Thursday, July 23, 2015

A Reductio for Eliminative Materialism

Can arguments for eliminative materialism be made without employing some aspects of so-called “folk psychology” and does it matter if they cannot? These are questions I want to explore.